The Enforcement Power in Crisis by Araiza, William D.
  
1 
THE ENFORCEMENT POWER IN CRISIS 
William D. Araiza* 
I.  THE PROBLEM 
It may seem hyperbolic to declare the enforcement power to be  in cri-
sis.  But developments over the last decade have raised serious questions 
about the coherence and credibility of judicial scrutiny of enforcement 
legislation.  At the same time, the results of that scrutiny—most notably, 
the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Shelby County v. Holder1—threaten 
the legacy of the Second Reconstruction.  If we recognize that enforce-
ment power scrutiny appears analytically incoherent, lacking in compe-
tence-based credibility, and destructive of one of the crown jewels of the 
modern civil rights movement, it becomes less shrill to use the word “cri-
sis” to describe the current state of affairs. 
Two developments have caused much of the problem.  First, the Court 
has created both analytical confusion and practical dead-ends by focusing 
its enforcement power analysis on judicially created doctrine, rather than 
core constitutional meaning.  Most notably, its “congruence and propor-
tionality” review of equal protection enforcement legislation has em-
ployed as its focal point the tiered scrutiny level a group enjoys.  I have ar-
gued elsewhere that this approach misconceives the proper inquiry, by 
examining whether enforcement legislation is congruent and proportional 
to that judge-created decisional heuristic, rather than to any core equal 
protection requirements the challenged legislation seeks to enforce.2 
This analytical mistake has become a high-stakes matter.  The Court’s 
seeming abandonment of serious suspect class analysis, in favor of a more 
particularized, case-by-case inquiry into whether the challenged action re-
flects irrationality, or more frequently, “animus,” threatens to destabilize 
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its approach to congruence and proportionality review.  Simply put, if the 
Court no longer seriously inquires whether a particular species of discrim-
ination warrants heightened scrutiny, then enforcement legislation bene-
fitting emerging groups or addressing emerging discrimination cannot be 
coherently analyzed for congruence and proportionality under the Court’s 
current approach.3 
Thus, unless the Court changes direction, groups who have not already 
had their suspect class status determined likely never will.  Yet those 
groups—most notably gays and lesbians, but also others—are among the 
most visible advocates of equality legislation today.  As they obtain anti-
discrimination legislation that must be at least partially grounded on the 
enforcement power,4 the ambiguity surrounding their suspect class status 
will cloud the constitutionality of such laws. 
Second, the Court has recently exhibited a marked willingness to sec-
ond-guess the empirical or policy foundations for enforcement legislation.  
Such skepticism can be traced to the early years of modern enforcement 
power doctrine.  Most (in)famously, in Board of Trustees v. Garrett,5 the 
Court disregarded as irrelevant most of the factual record supporting the 
enforcement power foundation of the Americans with Disabilities Act’s 
(“ADA”) employment provisions, and thus concluded that the law simply 
did not address a serious problem of unconstitutional discrimination.  But 
Garrett could be bracketed—and its troubling implications for congres-
sional power cabined—by observing that the Court understood the ADA as 
targeting a type of discrimination it believed presented only a trivial con-
stitutional issue.  The Court itself encouraged this reading of Garrett 
when, two years later, it upheld enforcement legislation aimed at sex dis-
crimination.  In that case, Nevada Department of Human Resources v. 
Hibbs, the Court stated that “because the standard for demonstrating the 
constitutionality of a gender-based classification is more difficult to meet 
than our rational-basis test, it was easier for Congress to show a pattern of 
state constitutional violations” justifying enforcement legislation.6 
 
 3 I have discussed this phenomenon in the context of the Court’s decision in United States v. 
Windsor, and the significance of Windsor’s methodology for the enforcement power.  See Wil-
liam D. Araiza, After the Tiers:  Windsor, Congressional Power to Enforce Equal Protection, and 
the Challenge of Pointillist Constitutionalism, 94 B.U. L. REV. 367, 374 (2014). 
 4 See Florida v. Seminole Tribe of Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (rejecting Article I as a source of 
power to render states liable for retrospective relief for violating federal law).  Some regulatory 
areas, such as family and marriage law, may be entirely beyond the reach of the commerce 
power, thus rendering the enforcement power even more crucial.  See United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549, 564, 565 (1995) (suggesting such limits). 
 5 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that the employment provisions of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act do not constitute valid enforcement legislation). 
 6 538 U.S. 721, 722 (2003). 
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However, more recently the Court has exhibited similar skepticism 
when considering enforcement legislation targeting discrimination the 
Court itself recognizes as implicating fundamental constitutional commit-
ments.  In the 2012 case Coleman v. Court of Appeals,7 it concluded that a 
different provision of the same statute challenged in Hibbs,8 the Family 
and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), was invalid enforcement legislation, de-
spite its earlier recognition of sex discrimination as a central equal protec-
tion concern.  And, of course, there is Shelby County.  There too the Court 
found that enforcement legislation exceeded Congress’s power, despite 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments’ central focus on the racial 
equality right Congress sought to enforce in the Voting Rights Act 
(“VRA”).9 
Coleman and Shelby County shattered the Court’s earlier template, in 
which legislation enforcing constitutional rights the Court itself recognized 
as fundamental received more deferential scrutiny.  In one sense this is a 
welcome development:  this Article began by arguing that the Court’s en-
forcement power doctrine inappropriately keys enforcement power re-
view to the constitutional status of the enforced right, as courts recog-
nized that right through decisional heuristics such as tiered scrutiny 
analysis.  By abandoning that approach, the Court has laid the groundwork 
for an approach that employs the correct focal point for congruence and 
proportionality review—the actual meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment provision at issue. 
But in pointing toward a solution to one problem, the Court has likely 
created another.  After Coleman and Shelby County, courts now face a 
wide open field when considering how much deference to accord congres-
sional judgments supporting the factual and policy bases for particular en-
forcement legislation.  Justice Antonin Scalia identified this problem as 
early as 2004, when he criticized the congruence and proportionality test 
as “flabby” and enmeshing the Court in a disrespectful, “policy-driven” 
“check[ing]” of Congress’s “homework.”10  Even more trenchantly, in 
Coleman he observed that both the plurality’s and the dissent’s applica-
tion of the congruence and proportionality test appeared plausible to 
him.11 
That indeterminacy constitutes the heart of this second problem.  To-
day the Court apparently feels no hesitation in second-guessing quintes-
 
 7 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012) (holding that the self-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act 
does not constitute valid enforcement legislation). 
 8 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 725. 
 9 Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 10 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 508, 554, 557–58 (2004) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (discussing the dan-
gers of and problems with the “congruence and proportionality” standard). 
 11 132 S. Ct. at 1338 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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sentially legislative judgments about the factual foundations or policy 
need for enforcement legislation.  To illustrate this point, consider the 
verdict the Coleman plurality rendered on the policy arguments support-
ing the FMLA’s self-care provision:  “overly complicated” and “unconvinc-
ing.”12  Consider also Shelby County, which devoted just one sentence to 
rejecting the argument that the preclearance provisions’ coverage formula 
was appropriate to deter previously discriminatory jurisdictions from 
backsliding.13  Clearly, this freedom to disagree with Congress about such 
policy matters extends, not just to issues the Court considers to lay at the 
periphery of the Reconstruction Amendments’ concerns, but to issues that 
reside at their very center.  Just as troublingly, no objective guideposts 
guide the Court’s review of such matters. 
II.  A NEW FRAME 
These problems are serious, as matters of logic, institutional compe-
tence, and concrete results.  A new enforcement power issue, not yet a 
live legal question, highlights these concerns.  This new issue potentially 
offers the Court the opportunity to rectify its enforcement power juris-
prudence.  But it also threatens to expose deep problems with the con-
gruence and proportionality approach the Court has now applied for near-
ly two decades. 
A.  The Promise 
In the 2008 case Heller v. Doe, the Court, using an explicitly originalist 
analysis, held that the Second Amendment protected an individual right to 
possess firearms.14  Two years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago,15 it 
held that that right, in its precise, Heller-announced form, applied to the 
states via the Fourteenth Amendment.  Together, Heller and McDonald 
recognized a new right—i.e., a right the Court had not previously 
acknowledged. 
The Second Amendment presents a potentially interesting opportunity 
for the Court to reconsider its enforcement power jurisprudence.  To be 
sure, Congress must provide that opportunity by legislating to protect the 
gun possession right.  But it’s at least plausible that the requisite legisla-
tive coalition could be crafted.  In turn, such legislation, especially to the 
 
 12 Id. at 1336 (plurality opinion). 
 13 See 133 S. Ct. at 2627 (“Under [the deterrence] theory, however, § 5 would be effectively im-
mune from scrutiny; no matter how ‘clean’ the record of covered jurisdictions, the argument 
could always be made that it was deterrence that accounted for the good behavior.”). 
 14 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
 15 561 U.S. 742, 749–50 (2010). 
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extent it focuses on gun possession rights, would likely find its most con-
venient constitutional foundation in the enforcement power.16 
Two characteristics of the Second Amendment right would make a 
challenge to that law an interesting case study.  First, the right’s novelty 
means that the Court would be writing on a largely blank slate when con-
struing the right Congress sought to enforce.  Thus, those interpretations 
of the Second Amendment would turn relatively more heavily on the 
Court’s self-consciously originalist parsing of the text, rather than on pre-
existing precedent which might otherwise channel the Court away from a 
purely originalist approach.17 
The Court’s adoption of an explicitly originalist methodology for identi-
fying a right carries implications for its analysis of legislation enforcing that 
right.  Originalist methodology claims to uncover actual constitutional 
meaning, as revealed through what originalists believe is its true source— 
the original meaning of the constitutional text.  This differs fundamentally 
from the decisional heuristic of suspect class analysis, which by contrast 
seeks judicially manageable methods of reaching results consistent with 
presumed constitutional meaning, rather than uncovering that meaning 
itself.18 
Thus, congruence and proportionality review of legislation enforcing a 
right explicated through originalist methodology would presumably use as 
its focal point a judicial statement of the underlying right that portrayed 
itself as expressing core constitutional meaning.  Such review would there-
fore likely avoid the mistake the Court has made in its equal protection en-
forcement jurisprudence of focusing its review on the wrong target.  In-
deed, such review might cast into sharp relief the mistakenness of that 
jurisprudence.  To be clear, none of this necessarily suggests originalism’s 
superiority as a methodology; that debate is far too extensive to evaluate 
here.19   Nevertheless, for an originalist Court, originalism’s claim that it 
aims precisely at, and is uniquely capable of, uncovering true constitution-
 
 16 Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (striking down a federal gun possession 
statute as exceeding the commerce power). 
 17 Cf. Kurt Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437, 
1473 (2007) (noting how an originalist judge’s fidelity to non-originalist precedent might precip-
itate a conflict with her commitment to originalism). 
 18 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2716 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Underly-
ing our equal protection jurisprudence is the central notion that a classification must be rea-
sonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substan-
tial relation to the object of the legislation . . . . The modern tiers of scrutiny . . . are a heuristic 
to help judges determine when classifications have that fair and substantial relation . . . .”) (in-
ternal quotations and brackets omitted). 
 19 For a useful guide to the history and current status of the debate over originalism, see Stephen 
Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185 (2008). 
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al meaning20 suggests that an enforcement power decision involving an 
originalist-construed right may exert a helpful gravitational pull on en-
forcement power jurisprudence more generally. 
To be sure, such a refocusing would not make congruence and propor-
tionality review easier for courts.  One of the collateral benefits of the 
Court’s pre-Coleman approach to equal protection enforcement legisla-
tion is that it simplifies the analysis considerably.  Under that approach, 
enforcement legislation targeting a suspect classification merits deferen-
tial review, while legislation targeting a non-suspect classification requires 
more stringent scrutiny.21  By embedding that deference choice into the 
analysis, this approach to congruence and proportionality review allows 
the Court to elide difficult questions about the deference properly due 
Congress’s fact-findings and policy judgments supporting enforcement 
legislation. 
Abandoning that approach, in favor of one that uses core constitution-
al meaning as its focal point, will require the Court to face the deference 
question more explicitly.  This is particularly true in the context of equal 
protection enforcement legislation, given the vagueness inherent in the 
core equal protection requirements that government act rationally and in 
pursuit of a public purpose.22  That vagueness necessarily increases the 
importance of the Court’s receptivity to Congress’s arguments that either 
empirical facts or legislative policy judgments support a connection be-
tween equal protection’s core requirements and the challenged enforce-
ment statute. 
B.  The Peril 
Such refocused congruence and proportionality review of equal pro-
tection enforcement legislation would potentially be encouraged by the 
precedent of a case where the Court similarly focused on core constitu-
tional meaning when reviewing a gun rights enforcement statute.  But at-
tempts to implement such refocused enforcement power review may 
 
 20 See, e.g., Eric Berger, Originalism’s Pretenses, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 329, 330 (2013) (“Because 
originalism fixes a constitutional provision’s meaning at the moment of its framing or ratifica-
tion, new originalists argue, judges are constrained from supplanting the real Constitution with 
their own values.”). 
 21 See, e.g., Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736 (stating that “it was easier” for Congress to show a pattern of 
unconstitutional state conduct when Congress sought to enforce the equal protection right to 
sex equality, as opposed to the equal protection right to non-discrimination on the basis of age 
or disability). 
 22 For a statement about the overall vagueness of the equal protection guarantee, see Peter 
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982).  For a discussion of the analyti-
cal complexity of the concept of irrational government action, see H. Jefferson Powell, Reason-
ing About the Irrational:  The Roberts Court and the Future of Constitutional Law, 86 WASH. L. 
REV. 217, 267–76 (2011). 
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demonstrate the limitations of the congruence and proportionality test 
more generally.  Indeed, a hypothetical gun statute might pose that chal-
lenge in its starkest terms. 
Consider the Second Amendment in more detail.  Heller employed 
originalist methodology to conclude that the Second Amendment protects 
an individual firearms possession right, the “core” of which consists of the 
right to possess commonly available weapons for self-defense23—most 
“acute[ly]”24 in the home.  The right may also extend beyond the home:  
Heller presumptively approved of laws restricting gun possession in “sensi-
tive” public places (e.g., schools), thus intimating that other public areas 
might be open for gun possession.25 
How does this statement of the right affect Congress’s latitude to en-
act legislation enforcing it?  In explicitly stating core Second Amendment 
meaning, Heller seemingly clarifies enforcement power analysis by provid-
ing an unambiguous focal point for congruence and proportionality re-
view.  But this seeming clarity—which solves the first problem this Article 
has identified—rely pushes the difficult work to the next problem it noted:  
the deference question. 
Consider some examples.  What if Congress enacts a law giving Ameri-
cans a right to possess ammunition?  One would think that such a law 
would easily survive enforcement power review, given the necessary con-
nection between ammunition and the use of a gun for self-defense.  But 
even this straightforward case elides difficult questions of degree.  For ex-
ample, what deference should a court accord congressional judgments 
that rights to possess a particular amount or type of ammunition are nec-
essary to vindicate the core right identified in Heller?  Hundreds of 
rounds?  Armor-piercing bullets?  Even assuming away these difficulties, 
more difficult issues immediately arise.  What about firing ranges?  If the 
Heller right is the right to use a gun for self-defense, could Congress enact 
a law prohibiting states from restricting firing ranges, or even the outdoor 
discharge of weapons, on the theory that such activities were necessary to 
allow Americans to develop the skills requisite to armed self-defense?  
What about restrictions on transporting guns?  Surely, a right to possess 
arms for self-defense is difficult to vindicate if one can’t transport the 
weapon.  Could Congress decide that a right to transport a weapon consti-
tutes a necessary adjunct to the Heller self-defense possession right? 
These questions are difficult because they implicate both Congress’s 
power to find facts and make policy, as well as the Court’s power, asserted 
 
 23 554 U.S. at 630. 
 24 Id. at 628. 
 25 See, e.g., Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1153 (9th Cir. 2014) (reasoning in this 
manner). 
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in City of Boerne v. Flores, to decree ultimate constitutional meaning.26  In 
other words, legislation like these hypothetical laws might be justified as 
resting on Congress’s fact- or policy-based conclusions about what is nec-
essary in order to vindicate the core right announced in Heller.  But it 
could also be viewed as effectively expanding the scope of that right, and 
thus violating the judicial interpretive supremacy principle underlying 
Boerne. 
III.  BACK TO THE FUTURE? 
How should a court decide whether such laws reflect Congress’s judg-
ments about the best ways to enforce the Second Amendment, or alterna-
tively, its attempt to re-interpret the Second Amendment more expansive-
ly?  Leaving aside Justice Scalia’s rejection of any congressional power to 
craft prophylactic enforcement legislation other than in the area of race,27 
the only plausible way to balance these roles is for the Court to “check 
Congress’s homework”28—that is, scrutinize with some care its fact-finding 
record and policy analysis.  If we exclude the cases where that scrutiny 
was aided by a thumb on the scales in one direction or another (that is, 
the cases where equality enforcing legislation received either skeptical or 
deferential review based on the suspectness of the targeted discrimina-
tion), then we are left essentially with three cases:  Coleman, Shelby Coun-
ty, and Boerne itself.29 
A.  Coleman and Shelby County 
These cases are not encouraging models.  In Coleman the Court simply 
pronounced the plaintiff’s policy defense of the FMLA’s self-care provision 
“overly complicated” and “unconvincing,” despite Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg’s argument, in dissent, laying out a plausible explanation for how 
self-care leave available on a sex-neutral basis counteracted sex stereotyp-
ing.30  Shelby County fares no better, especially if we focus on the VRA de-
fenders’ argument that the preclearance provisions’ coverage formula 
 
 26 See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (“It is for Congress in the first instance to ‘determin[e] whether and 
what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment,’ and its 
conclusions are entitled to much deference. Congress’ discretion is not unlimited, however, and 
the courts retain the power, as they have since Marbury v. Madison, to determine if Congress 
has exceeded its authority under the Constitution.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 27 See 541 U.S. at 559–61 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 28 See id. at 557–58. 
 29 The Court has decided other enforcement power cases since Boerne.  But, for reasons beyond 
the scope of this short Article, they do not furnish models of the sort at issue here. 
 30 See 132 S. Ct. at 1336 (majority opinion) (pronouncing the argument “overly complicated” and 
“unconvincing”); id. at 1339, 1347–49 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining how self-care leave 
available on a sex-neutral basis counteracted sex stereotyping). 
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made sense because those provisions deterred the covered jurisdictions 
from backsliding on their acknowledged improvement in protecting voting 
rights.31  Chief Justice John Roberts’ majority opinion failed to seriously 
engage that argument.  His entire response consisted of a one sentence 
complaint that accepting the deterrence argument would justify indefinite 
VRA renewals.32  Notwithstanding the casualness of his (non)response, his 
concern is reasonable:  any deterrence argument requires counter-factual 
analysis that courts are ill-suited to perform.  But that observation just 
begs the question how courts should respond to that challenge.  If courts 
are ill-suited to perform such review, then perhaps they should not try, or 
at least should show some respect for Congress’s conclusions. 
B.  Back to Boerne? 
Perhaps Boerne itself provides the most apt model for congruence and 
proportionality review keyed to the core meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment right Congress seeks to enforce.  In Boerne, Justice Anthony 
Kennedy was careful to begin his analysis, not by discussing the enforce-
ment power, but by summarizing the Court’s analysis in Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith33, the case that triggered the Relgious Freedom Restoration 
Act (“RFRA”).34  Later, after setting forth his understanding of the en-
forcement power and announcing the congruence and proportionality 
test, he applied that understanding by considering whether RFRA’s legisla-
tive record contained “examples of modern instances of” laws that violat-
ed Smith’s rule—i.e., “generally applicable laws passed because of reli-
gious bigotry.”35 
Thus, in Boerne, Justice Kennedy first identified the core meaning of 
the Free Exercise right RFRA ostensibly sought to enforce, before applying 
congruence and proportionality review.  One might therefore consider 
Boerne a model of congruence and proportionality review that focuses on 
the correct target—core constitutional meaning rather than decisional 
heuristics. 
Unfortunately, the matter is more complex.  First, Smith itself is more 
ambiguous than Justice Kennedy implied.  Smith rejected the then-
prevailing approach to Free Exercise claims not just because it was sup-
posedly incorrect as a matter of constitutional law, but also because of 
concern that judges were incapable of performing that analysis in a princi-
 
 31 See 133 S. Ct. at 2627 (acknowledging the backsliding argument). 
 32 See supra note 13. 
 33 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 34 See 521 U.S. at 512–14. 
 35 Id. at 530. 
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pled fashion.36  To the extent Smith rests in part on concerns about judicial 
competence, it looks less like a pure statement of core constitutional law 
to which a religious exercise enforcement statute could appropriately be 
compared for congruence and proportionality.37 
Second Amendment and equal protection jurisprudence may be simi-
larly resistant to such “pure” judicial statements of core constitutional 
principle that stand completely divorced from decisional heuristics adopt-
ed for institutional competence reasons.  Already, lower courts grappling 
with Heller are employing the very interest balancing Justice Scalia criti-
cized in Heller itself.38  This should not be surprising:  once one considers 
laws regulating conduct other than the core conduct Heller identified as 
protected, one might expect courts to default to such judicial decision 
rules.  But to the extent these cases reflect relatively heavier doses of such 
decision rules and lighter doses of core constitutional principle, Second 
Amendment jurisprudence starts looking more like the equal protection 
doctrine this Article suggests furnishes the wrong focal point for congru-
ence and proportionality review.  More importantly, over time perhaps 
both of these doctrines necessarily start comprising heavier doses of such 
decision rules, if, as some originalists acknowledge, core constitutional 
principles sometimes simply run out before they decide difficult, concrete, 
cases. 
C.  The Need For Deference 
This analysis suggests that the deference question—the second of the 
two challenges this Article has identified as facing the Court’s enforce-
ment power doctrine—is unavoidable.  To put the matter bluntly, at some 
point the Court must realize that congruence and proportionality scrutiny 
has to rest on one of two foundations.  Either the Court must continue us-
ing judicial doctrine as the focal point for such review, even when that 
doctrine does not logically furnish the appropriate target; or it must de-
velop principled rules governing when to defer to congressional judg-
ments supporting enforcement legislation, as tested against core constitu-
tional principles.  Doctrine (such as equal protection suspect class status) 
and deference principles can each guide the Court’s review of Congress’s 
 
 36 See 494 U.S. at 889 n.5 (“[I]t is horrible to contemplate that federal judges will regularly balance 
against the importance of general laws the significance of religious practice.”). 
 37 See ARAIZA, ENFORCING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE, supra note 2, at 238-242. 
 38 See, e.g., Allan Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle Over the Second Amend-
ment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 757 (2012) (“Struggling to work within the more categorical 
framework of decisionmaking favored by Justice Scalia [in Heller], the lower courts have essen-
tially wound up embracing the sort of interest balancing that Justice Breyer recommended and 
that Scalia vociferously denounced.”). 
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factual and policy judgments.  Until recently, the Court has used doctrine.  
In Coleman and Shelby County, the Court ignored it.39 
This abandonment of judicial doctrine as the focal point for congru-
ence and proportionality review is laudable.  But that abandonment in 
turn triggers a need for other guideposts for judicial review.  Those guide-
posts must take the form of a set of deference principles, explicitly stated 
and applied in as principled a manner as possible.40  To ignore both doc-
trine and deference is to risk unmooring congruence and proportionality 
review entirely, leaving the Court free to “check” Congress’s factual and 
policy “homework” at its whim.41  That may be the worst possible out-
come, one that would truly throw the enforcement power into crisis. 
 
 39 See supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text. 
 40 I and others have attempted to provide such deference principles.  See William D. Araiza, Defer-
ence to Congressional Fact-Finding in Rights-Enforcing and Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 878, 906–26 (2013); Eric Berger, Deference Determinations and Stealth Constitutional 
Decisionmaking, 98 IOWA L. REV. 465, 498–518 (2013). 
 41 See supra note 10. 
